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Abstract—The integration of cyber technologies (computing
and communication) with the physical world gives rise to
complex systems referred to as Cyber Physical Systems (CPS),
for example, manufacturing, transportation, smart grid, and
water treatment. Many of those systems are part of the critical
infrastructure and need to perform safely, reliably, and securely
in real-time. CPS security is challenging as compared to the
conventional IT systems. An adversary can compromise the
system in both the cyber and the physical domains. However,
the unique set of technologies and processes being used in a CPS
also bring up opportunities for defense. CPS security has been
approached in several ways due to the complex interaction of
physical and cyber components. In this work, a comprehensive
study is taken to summarize the challenges and the proposed
solutions for securing CPS from a Physics-based perspective.
Index Terms—Cyber physical systems, CPS security, Physics-
based attack detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent progress in technology is resulting in the digitization
of the physical world and things around us. It is expected
that communication and computing capabilities will soon
be part of all the physical objects [1]. The integration of
cyber technologies (computing and communication) with the
physical world gives rise to complex systems referred to as
Cyber Physical Systems (CPS). CPS has changed the methods
that humans used to interact with the physical world. Some
examples of CPS are manufacturing, transportation, smart grid,
water treatment, medical devices and the Industrial Internet
of Things (IIoT) [2]. Many of those systems are part of the
critical infrastructure, and need to perform safely, reliably, and
securely in real time. This article discusses the security issues
related to CPS.
A CPS consists of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC),
sensors, actuators, Supervisory Control, and Data Acqui-
sition (SCADA) workstation and Human Machine Inter-
face (HMI) that are interconnected via a communications net-
work. The PLCs control a physical process based on the sensor
measurements. The advances in communication technologies
help to better monitor and operate CPS, but this connectivity
also exposes physical processes to malicious entities on the
cyber and physical domains. Recent incidents of sabotage on
these systems [3]–[5], have raised concerns on the security of
CPS [6].
Challenges in CPS security are different as compared with
the conventional IT systems, especially in terms of conse-
quences in case of a security lapse. Attacks on CPS might
result in damage to the physical property, as a result of an
explosion [7], [8] or severely affect people who depend on
critical infrastructure as was the case of recent power cutoff
in Ukraine [3]. Data integrity is an important security require-
ment for CPS [9] and hence the integrity of sensor data should
be ensured. Sensor data can either be spoofed in cyber (digital)
domain [10] or in physical (analog) domain [11], [12]. Sensors
are a bridge between the physical and cyber domains in a CPS.
Traditionally, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) monitors a
communication network or a computing host to detect attacks.
However, physical tampering with sensors or sensor spoofing
in the physical/analog domain may go undetected by the legacy
IDS [11].
In this article, we briefly introduce CPS using an example
from the electric power and water treatment system, highlight
the challenges and opportunities based on the physics of the
systems. Detection techniques based on physics of the process
against attacks on sensor reading have been proposed in recent
studies [11]–[17]. An attacker who tries to defy rules of
physics would also expose itself. An understanding of the
physics of the process can help to secure a CPS [18]. A
mini-survey of the existing techniques is presented by high-
lighting the limitations of the previous works and proposed
improvements. A device fingerprinting technique used for
attack detection in CPS is explained before concluding the
article.
II. CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
Cyber Physical System (CPS) is a broad term for systems
ranging from medical, power, transport and industrial systems.
In the following we highlight two major sectors applicable to
our daily life, that is, electrical power and water treatment
systems. An example of a CPS is shown in Figure 1. It shows
the high-level architecture of an electrical power system. This
is composed of electricity generation (power plants), trans-
mission (electric grid system) and end-users (smart home).
As one can imagine this power system is composed of a
multitude of devices and physical processes. Power generation
and transmission depend on the demand from the utilities and
the users. To meet the requirements of the energy demand the
critical infrastructure is utilized to ensure a continuous supply
of power. Each of the processes in the critical infrastructure
is a complex engineering system and needs a sophisticated
control to achieve its desired objectives. For example, at the
generation stage, we have generators, Intelligent Electronic
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2Fig. 1. A generic electrical power system as an example of CPS.
Devices (IEDs) also incorporating electric relays, all these
devices are autonomously controlled by the Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLC). This means that we have a lot of
sensors monitoring the physical process, actuators/generators
and the physical infrastructure that communicate the current
physical states with each other and with the PLC.
A similar example is a water treatment system which is
one of the critical infrastructures of any modern society.
Figure 2 shows a generic overview of a water treatment
system, note that the distribution network is intentionally not
shown to simplify the illustration in both the power and water
systems. Water treatment system employs sensors to measure
the flow, pressure, chemical components, level at different
nodes, and also equipped with actuators, e.g., motorized valves
and pumps to deliver water as required by each consumer. All
these processes are controlled and operated autonomously. The
automation achieved due to autonomous communication has
resulted in efficient monitoring and managing of the physical
processes but at the same time opened up these systems for
unwanted entities.
As explained earlier CPS is a broad term and encompasses
a lot of interdisciplinary fields. In this article, we focus on
industrial CPS similar to examples outlined here. Since a lot
of work surveyed in this article is based on an industrial
CPS or industrial control system, our proposed device finger-
printing technique is also tested on a water treatment system.
In the following, an abstraction of the well known Purdue
architecture [19] for each stage of the critical infrastructure is
presented.
A. Architecture of an Industrial CPS
An industrial control system (ICS) controls a physical
process. An ICS takes advantage of the advances in automa-
tion technology and interconnected devices. A typical ICS is
composed of field devices, e.g., sensors and actuators; control
devices, e.g., PLC; monitoring devices, e.g., HMI; control and
data logging, e.g., SCADA workstation and programming ter-
minals. In general an ICS follows a layered architecture [19].
As shown in Figure 3, there are three levels of a communi-
cation network. Level 0 is the field communication network
and is composed of field devices, e.g., remote I/O units and
communication interfaces to send/receive information to/from
PLCs. Using the level 0 network, sensors send the physical
process state to the PLCs and in turn, PLCs send the control
commands to the actuators. Level 1 is the communication
layer used by PLCs to communicate with each other for
exchanging data to make control decisions. Level 2 network is
used by PLCs to communicate with the SCADA workstation,
HMI, historian server; this is known as the supervisory control
network.
The communication protocols in an ICS have been pro-
prietary until recently when the focus shifted to using the
enterprise network technologies for ease of deployment and
scalability, such as the Ethernet and TCP/IP. A survey of
communication protocols in an ICS can be found in [20]. The
Figure 3, also represents a specific example of a water treat-
ment testbed used in this study. The communication protocol
in the testbed is the Common Industrial Protocol (CIP). CIP
is an application layer protocol on top of Ethernet/IP (ENIP)
to exchange data at level 1 and level 2 [21], [22]. The
messages between the devices can use either wired media,
i.e. IEEE 802.3, Ethernet, or wireless media i.e. IEEE 802.11
WiFi standard. There are two generic types of messages in
the CIP/ENIP standard. i.e. explicit messaging and implicit
messaging [21]. Explicit messages use CIP as an application
layer protocol and use TCP/IP service to establish a connec-
tion. An example is a PLC sending a request message for the
exchange of data to another PLC. Implicit messaging, also
known as I/O messaging, is used to communicate between
PLC and I/O devices. Implicit messages use ENIP protocol
on top of UDP/IP service. Implicit messaging is used with
time-critical devices, for the reason that those uses UDP and
does not need acknowledgment of the transmitted messages
as in the case of CIP. Without an authentication mechanism,
one could not be sure if these commands are coming from the
legitimate PLC.
Input signals to a PLC (yk) can be digital or analog.
Digital signals are ON and OFF and analog signals have
a continuous range of values. These signals originate from
sensors or switches and are represented in the form of voltage
3Fig. 2. A generic water treatment system as an example of CPS.
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Fig. 3. An Industrial CPS architecture. Three different communication network levels are shown namely level 0, level 1 and level 2. An attacker can
compromise these communication networks as well as the physical components.
or current. For example, a sensor measuring values using 4-
20 mA current loop scales the minimum value to 4 mA and
the highest value to 20 mA. These analog signals are fed
to an analog to digital converter before given to a PLC for
processing. Without an authentication mechanism, the integrity
of the signals cannot be assured. Similarly, output signals from
a PLC are fed to a digital to analog converter before given
to the field devices. The output (uk) interface sends control
commands to the actuators and also transmits the messages
to rest of the PLCs. Without the authentication mechanism,
one could not be sure if these commands are coming from the
legitimate PLC.
In the following requirements for a CPS are discussed
before mentioning the related security challenges.
B. CPS Requirements
CPS monitor and control the physical world and to satisfy
the real-world constraints it should be designed to address the
following requirements.
• Real-time Response: CPS should satisfy the real-time
constraints depending on the process. For example, if the
process under consideration is electricity the response
regarding the sensor measurements should be quick as
compared to the water systems. However, each process
has its own real-time response constraints which should
be fulfilled. Any delays in dissemination of commands
due to a fault or an attack (e.g., Denial of Service), can
prove to be disastrous.
• Resource Constraints: Most of the devices in a CPS
are resource constraint. For example, sensing devices,
analog to digital converters, remote input/output (remote
I/O) units and controllers are designed to perform specific
functions with the limited memory and processing power.
The main idea is for the devices to be robust, function for
long time periods e.g., 15-20 years and meet the real-time
performance constraints.
• Availability: Shutting down a plant is a much more
complicated business than restarting a server. CPS has
4an important requirement of availability. Critical nature of
these systems requires a very high availability as could be
the case of temperature regulator in a critical biological
process or electric grid. Therefore, upgrading hardware
and software is also challenging for CPS due to high
up-time. The core idea is to not to interfere with the
functionality of the CPS.
C. CPS Security Challenges
From the above discussion, it is clear that the CPS systems
are not the same as the typical IT systems. Both types of
systems differ in system requirements and also differ in terms
of security requirements/challenges. In general, the security
policies for IT systems are defined as CIA paradigm, namely
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of the data. However,
in CPS security the paradigm is the same but in an inverted
order by importance, that is, in CPS it is AIC namely Avail-
ability, Integrity and Confidentiality.
• Availability: This security property ensures that the sys-
tem or service is available to the authorized persons. As
discussed in the previous section, the availability is the
important requirement of a CPS and in terms of security, it
is the most important property of the system. Few threats
possible are Denial of Service (DoS) attacks or jamming
attacks.
• Integrity: Integrity compromise refers to the modification
or destruction of data by unauthorized entities. In CPS an
attacker can compromise the integrity of sensor data or
the commands transmitted by the PLCs. In IT systems
confidentiality is more important than integrity but in a
CPS integrity of data is considered more important than
to keep it confidential [6].
• Confidentiality: This defines the authorized access to the
information. Passwords and data encryption are standard
techniques to ensure confidentiality of the data. Although
solutions grounded in cryptography, such as those that
use TLS, HMACs or other authentication and/or integrity
guarantees have been advocated in the context of CPS,
historically such countermeasures are not widespread due
to limitations in hardware and relative computational cost
of such protocols [6], [23]. Since many CPS run legacy
hardware and are intended to do so for several years, the
problem of raising the bar against authentication attacks
by device fingerprinting means is a practical one.
III. REPORTED ATTACKS ON CPS IN WILD
In this section, few famous CPS attacks are briefly dis-
cussed. Following those famous attacks would be a discussion
on particular attacks on sensors and PLCs from the academia
and industry.
a) Maroochy Shire (2000): This is an early example of
an attack on a CPS executed by a disgruntled employee. The
attack was carried out in early 2000 by an employee of a
contractor who failed to get a job at Maroochy Shire Council.
He used the radio terminals installed by himself to spill the
sewage in public parks and streets [4].
b) Stuxnet (2010): This attack is discovered in mid-2010
which targeted Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities [5], [24].
Stuxnet was a highly sophisticated worm which exploited 0day
vulnerabilities, relied on root-kits to hide, update itself, used
stolen certificates and replayed sensor and network data. It
is reported to be a successful attack end up destroying target
centrifuges.
c) Ukrainian Electric Power Grid (2015,2016): In De-
cember 2015 cyberattacks on Ukrainian electric power grid cut
off the power supply to customers at the peak of the winter
season. The attackers remotely controlled the SCADA distri-
bution system and forced operators to switch to the manual
mode which resulted in much longer recovery times [3]. This
attack was over but for another attack to come in the next year
around the same time. In 2016 again Ukrainian electric power
grid met another cyber attack through the use of Crashoverride
malware [25], This attack switched circuit breakers in an
unusual open-close pattern in a fast manner, which resulted
in cutting off the power supply to the customers.
d) TRITON Attack (2017): This cyber attack was exe-
cuted on Saudi Arabia’s leading oil company Saudi Aramco.
The attack was launched using TRITON malware by getting
unauthorized access to the engineering workstation. The goal
was to reprogram the controllers and cause significant physical
damage. This attack forced controllers to enter into a failed
safe state disrupting the control of the heavy machinery [26].
e) Norsk Hydro Attack (2019): In March 2019 one of the
world’s biggest aluminum producers Norsk Hydro in Oslo was
subjected to a ransomware attack. This attack costed Hydro
$40 million in damages [27].
f) ASCO Industries Attack (2019): This is one of the
most recent attacks on CPS. ASCO industries manufacture
aerospace parts and got hit by a ransomware attack affecting
its production in plants around the world. This attack occurred
in mid-June 2019 and the damage is still being assessed [28].
Few of the famous attacks on CPS are discussed above.
In the following specific attacks on the industrial devices are
discussed.
A. Sophisticated Attacks on CPS in Research
An important difference between Cyber Physical Systems
(CPS) and traditional IT systems, is that CPS has a physical
space to secure besides the cyber domain. In this context,
an adversary can also launch an attack from the physical
domain, such attacks are not studied in earlier cyber security
research. In particular, the physical integrity of the CPS, and
its availability, are often more important than confidentiality
[9]. Moreover, in a CPS an attacker besides compromising
the computing elements e.g., sensors through communication
networks might also do so from the physical space. This is
illustrated for instance by a recent attack [12] where a crash
is induced in a drone by means of a sound signal that confuses
the gyroscope, or by carrying out an analog sensor spoofing
attack [11], [14], [16], [29]. In [29] attackers would inject data
using the sensing device wire as an antenna by intentional
electromagnetic interference at the resonant frequencies of
the sensing device. In [17] a new attack vector is proposed
5inspired from [12]. A modulated audio signal could result in
desired data injection [17]. A recent study has shown sonic
attacks for a range of smart sensing devices [30]. Anti-lock
braking system (ABS) is attacked in real vehicles using the
signal injection in the analog/physical domain [14]. A recent
article [31] attacked temperature sensor in infant incubators
using electromagnetic signals. Thus, security requirements for
CPS introduce new challenges and hence the need to expand
traditional attacker models to include physical and cyber-
physical characteristics of a system [32], and consequently
introduce a need for novel security solutions.
B. Attacks on PLCs
Guaranteeing data integrity in the presence of strong adver-
saries, for instance against those who can gain full control over
PLCs, is challenging. For instance, a study reported in [33]
reveals that a large number of PLCs are connected to the
Internet and contain vulnerabilities related to authentication.
Using the discovered vulnerability, the authentication mech-
anism is bypassed and full control over the PLC could be
achieved over the internet. The use of commercial off the
shelf (COTS) devices in a CPS, and software backdoor, can
lead to full control over PLCs [34]. In [35] authors have used
lack of authentication in the Modbus protocol to take over
the controllers and send unauthorized commands to the other
devices. Stuxnet is a famous example of a malware attack
where PLCs were hijacked and malicious code altered the
PLC’s configuration [24]. Attackers have executed web-based
DoS and resetting PLC attacks by exploiting bugs in PLC code
which were connected to the internet [36]. Recently a range
of malware and network-based attacks were designed and
executed against PLCs [37], [38]. Therefore, there is a need
for authenticating CPS devices non-invasively and without
disturbing their core functionality.
Fig. 4. Experiment Setup: Secure Water Treatment Testbed Plant Layout
(SWaT)
IV. PHYSICS BASED PERSPECTIVE
A. A Motivating Example
We will present our findings based on experimentation done
in a water treatment plant. Figure 4 shows a picture of the
testbed used. It is a six-stage water treatment process, for
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Fig. 5. A partial setup from a water treatment plant as a motivating example.
details refer to the testbed paper [39]. We will use the first
stage of the water treatment process as a motivating example.
A physical system diagram for stage 1 is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5 shows a level sensor mounted on top of the water
tank to the water level and the inflow and outflow of the water
is being controlled by the motorized valve (MV-101) at the
input and pump (P-101) at the output respectively. The idea is
to model this inflow and outflow by considering the physical
principles and the design of the physical process. For a tank,
we know that the rate of change of water inside the tank is
equal to the difference between water flowing into the tank
and water flowing out from the tank with respect to time. We
can represent this using the mass-balance equation such as,
dV
dt
= Qin −Qout
dh
dt
=
Qin −Qout
A
since V = A × h, (1)
where V represents the volume of the tank, A is the cross-
sectional area of the tank, and h is the height of the water
inside the tank, (1) provides a linear equation, we can see the
term [Qin − Qout] represents the water flow which depends
upon the PLC control actions implemented via MV-101 and
P-101. From Figure 5, it can be seen that using the height and
diameter of the tank from design documents, it is possible to
figure out the volume and the cross-sectional area of the tank.
Let us consider that state of the physical process as the height
of water inside the tank. Then the solution of this equation
gives us the following result.
xk+1 = xk + uk,
where uk is the PLC control action. Here xk represents water
level in the tank at time k. The control action uk can be a either
open/close (for the motorized valve) or on/off (for the pump).
Similarly we can describe the sensor state and we can get
the set of system equations. Following represents the systme
dynamics in form of a state space model.
{xk+1 = Axk +Buk + vk,
yk = Cxk + ηk.
(2)
Where yk is the sensor measurement driven by the control
action uk. Matrices A,B and C are the state-space matrices
of appropriate dimensions. vk and ηk are the process and
measurement noise vectors respectively. From (2), it can be
seen that if we have a system state value at time k, then given
the PLC control uk we can predict the next state at time k+1.
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Fig. 6. (Left): Probability distribution of the residue for level sensor
measurements without attack. (Right): Probability distribution of the residual
for water level sensor measurements with bias injection attack.
For example, if the MV-101 control is set to open the valve
and P-101 as turned ON, given the information of this control
from PLC, we know from the design of the physical process
that how much the water level in the tank should increase.
This is an example of how can we use the physics of the
system to model the physical process. Once the system model
has been obtained it is possible to learn the normal behavior
of the process in a mathematical form.
B. Attack Detection Framework
A general attack detection framework has two major com-
ponents, 1) system model and estimation and 2) a threshold
based detector.
System Model and Estimation: The idea of obtaining a system
model is explained in the previous section. The system models
can be obtained either using data based techniques or the first
principles [10], [40]–[42]. Using the system model it is possi-
ble to estimate the states of the system and ultimately estimate
output from a sensor (yˆk). A residual vector is calculated by
taking the difference between the sensor measurements and
estimated sensor output as,
rk = yk − yˆk. (3)
Where rk is the residual vector. For the residual, the hypothesis
testing is for H0, the normal mode (no attacks), and H1,
the faulty mode (with attacks). The residuals are obtained
using this data along with the state estimates. Thus, the two
hypotheses are stated as follows,
H0 ∶ { E[rk] = 0,
E[rkrTk ] = Σ, or H1 ∶ { E[rk] ≠ 0,E[rkrTk ] ≠ Σ.
Threshold based Detector: To detect the presence of an attack,
the residual vector is tested against a predefined threshold
designed for a particular false alarm rate. Figure 6 shows
the distribution for a residual vector with a mean value of 0
without an attack and the second plot in case of an attack. We
can create a threshold for the residual distribution and if the
values of residual are outside that threshold declare it under
an attack,
∣rk∣ > τ,Alarm = True. (4)
Where τ is a threshold and |rk | is the absolute value of the
residual. There have been studies on optimizing the parameters
of different stateful and stateless detectors [10], [43]. A wide
variety of algorithms exist to chose the best threshold value
to maximize the attack detection rate and minimize the false
alarm rate.
C. Prior Research
In this section, we will highlight the research that has been
done in CPS security exploiting the physical models of the
process. A general approach is to, 1) create models of the
normal process either based on the data from simulations/real
systems or based on the first principles, and 2) use the
statistical detectors to find if there are any deviations from
the normal/expected behavior.
One of the earlier works on the security of power systems
against data injection attacks is detailed in [44]. Authors had
shown that a bad data detector would raise an alarm for
random attacks similar to a fault but not a stealthy attack.
Another study related to a smart water distribution system [45]
has also made similar observations. These studies created the
models of the physical process based on simulations and the
real testbed respectively.
Process/Physical Invariants: The idea of invariants is to
model the physical states as such that certain physical laws
shall be obeyed. Invariants are designed using the relationship
between different state variables. No matter what happens
these relationships should not vary. Designed invariants are
using physical laws underneath to ensure the laws of physics
are being obeyed. A state relation based intrusion detection
is proposed in [46]. This study used a relational graph to
model the different nodes related to each other via a physical
principle. Similar research is conducted on a water treatment
system [47] by creating invariants from the physical process.
A more recent effort on similar lines is to create control
invariants [48]. The authors tested their approach on a drone.
Active Defense: Some techniques use active methods to detect
attacks. These techniques are a combination of modeling
the physics of the system and active detection methods. A
challenge-response based sensor attack detection technique is
presented in [11]. The proposed technique is tested on vehicles
for active sensors. Another active technique called as physical
watermarking is proposed in [49].
Control Theory/State Estimation: Most of the physics-based
detection techniques originate in control theory due to a history
of literature on modeling the physical processes. Also, fault
detection in control systems has been studied extensively over
the past half-century. There are several works on using the
model of a physical process [41], [42], [50], [51]. Most of
these works borrow ideas from fault detection literature and
has also contributed towards the limitations of fault detectors
7to be used as attack detectors. Towards that end, secure
state estimation has extensively been studied. Recently, a
research work in [52] proposed a search algorithm based on
Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) to speed up the search of
possible sensors sets, followed by an extended work to model
the noisy systems [53].
Unsupervised Learning: The problem with a supervised learn-
ing detection method is that it needs to learn the normal model
as well as from the data under attack. In real-world availability
of attack data is a big issue, therefore, some studies employ
semi-supervised or unsupervised learning for attack detection.
In the following a couple of the recent works [54], [55] are
discussed, those used the model from the plant dynamics and
unsupervised learning for attack detection. A signal entropy
based detector is used in [55] and one-class SVM is used in
[54] as a detector.
Physical Authentication: There have been some interesting
efforts to authenticate the control logic in a PLC by using
the physics of the process [56], [57]. One recent study had
exploited the physics of the process to discover an insider
threat [58].
Evaluation Metrics: A recent work in [10] proposed a new
evaluation metric for the physics based attack detection al-
gorithms. They considered a case of a stealthy attack and
measured its impact on the physical process. The list here
is by no means exhaustive, the intention is to give readers an
idea of how popular physics based methods are in the CPS
security.
D. Shortcomings of Prior Works
Interfering Techniques: Active defense techniques, for ex-
ample, watermarking or challenge-response can be considered
interfering with the normal operation of the process. In the
case of physical watermarking techniques, a noise signal is
added to the optimal control signal which can degrade the
performance of the system under study. Similarly in challenge-
response techniques, a challenge affects the performance of the
active sensors due to the introduced challenges. For a CPS a
non-interfering passive technique would be preferred.
Number of Devices under Attack: State estimation based and
invariants based techniques rely on the relationship between
sensors and actuators. If all the sensors and actuators are
under attack then model based methods shall fail. Therefore,
it is desired to design a technique that can identify attacks on
devices independently from other devices.
Stealthy Attacks: Most of the work using a system model
along with a statistical detector is prone to a smart attacker.
For example, if an attacker learns a threshold for the statistical
detector and stays below that, it does not get detected. From
Eq. (4) we can rewrite the expression as,
∣yk − yˆk∣ > τ. (5)
If sensor measurements are under attack (δk) then the attacked
sensor measurement goes to yak = yk + δk resulting in,∣yk + δk − yˆk∣ > τ. (6)
Remember δk is the attacker’s signal and it can choose it to be
anything. An attacker can always choose δk = yˆk−yk+τ which
will change the expression in Eq. (6) to τ > τ , which is never
true and no alarms will be raised although attacker is injection
a value of τ at each time step in the sensor measurement. Such
an attack is considered to be stealthy and in theory, can be
designed for any threshold based detector.
Lack of Testbed-based Validation: Most of the previous
studies are performed either on a dataset or a simulation based
model. It is important to validate the proposed techniques
on real systems or testbeds to identify challenges which an
operator or plant engineer might face when the system is under
attack or due to false alarms.
E. Suggested Improvements
Passive Attack Detection Techniques: Given the critical nature
of the industrial systems, it is desired to have a passive
technique for attack detection. We can not afford legacy ideas
of active defense from the IT security literature.
Assumption on Number of Devices under Attack: Ideally the
proposed attack detection techniques shall be independent of
the number of devices under attack. We should come up with
the methods where it would be possible to identify attacks on
each device separately.
Validation on Testbeds or Real Systems: Most of the previous
studies are based on the simulations. It is easier to work
with simulation models but those studies miss details that are
encountered in practice by industrial engineers.
In the following, we will summarize ideas related to authen-
ticating devices based on the hardware characteristics of the
devices, passively.
V. DEVICE FINGERPRINTING
A device fingerprint refers to some unique features of a
device’s hardware, software or a combination of both. Device
fingerprinting ideas have been tested in different domains. The
idea of fingerprinting a PC remotely based on its clock skew
is presented in [59]. Small microscopic deviations in device’s
clock [60], [61] is used as a fingerprint. In [62] inter-arrival
time of packets is analyzed to fingerprint devices on a small
campus network. In [63] hardware imperfections during the
sensor manufacturing process are exploited as a fingerprint for
a smartphone. In CPS a recent work tried to create fingerprints
for the actuators based on the opening/closing times [64].
Device fingerprinting techniques to authenticate devices and
passively detect attacks have been found promising in the
IT domain but for industrial-grade sensors, such a study
was needed. In the following, we briefly discuss one of our
proposed technique titled NoiSense [65].
NoiSense is proposed as a non-intrusive sensor fingerprint-
ing technique to authenticate sensors transmitting measure-
ments to one or more PLCs. Device fingerprinting ideas
existed in other fields as mentioned above, however, sensors in
a CPS are not functionally/computationally similar enough to
exhibit the above-mentioned fingerprints [64]. Thus, we seek
an answer to the question, Do sensors in a real-world CPS
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Fig. 7. Sensor noise from 10 ultrasonic level sensors and their noise vector distribution.
Fig. 8. A proof of existence of noise based sensor fingerprint for all the level sensors of same type and model based on three time domain features.
have unique fingerprints? It is known that hardware imperfec-
tions during the manufacturing process exhibit some unique
physical behaviors that are useful for profiling and fingerprint-
ing [63]. In particular, we observe that noise (imperfections in
measurements), an otherwise undesirable feature of sensors,
strongly depends on such manufacturing imperfections. These
variations affect each device differently and thus are hard to
control or reproduce [66], making it challenging for an attacker
to imitate sensor noise patterns.
NoiSense creates a fingerprint for a sensor based on a set of
time domain and frequency domain features that are extracted
from the sensor noise. A machine learning algorithm is used
to distinguish an individual sensor from others. Experiments
were performed on sensors of different types in an operational
water treatment and distribution facility accessible for research
[39], [67]. Sensor identification accuracy is observed to be as
high as 97%, with a low of 90%. It is also shown that the
proposed scheme is scalable for tens of sensors and that the
sensor fingerprint is stable over time. The true positive rate
for sensor identification is observed to be 100% for most of
9the sensors and false positive rate as low as 0%, see [65] for
details.
Does a unique fingerprint exist for each sensor? A limited
number of sensors were available in the water utility testbeds.
Hence, additional low-cost ultrasonic sensors are included
to explore the existence of fingerprints for many sensors of
the same type and model. To demonstrate the existence of
fingerprint, ten dual transducer ultrasonic sensors (HCSR04)
from the same manufacturer were used. All ten sensors were
mounted on the same water tank. Data was collected for
3 hours and many chunks of the collected data taken for
analysis. Each chunk consists of 300 readings from the sensor.
Figure 7 shows results for the collected data. The plot on the
left shows the variance of noise vector from each sensor for
all chunks. It is observed that some of these sensors have
a unique noise variance and can be distinguished from each
other but there remain few sensors that have similar noise
patterns in terms of noise variance. The middle pane is a
plot of the distribution of the noise vector from each sensor.
It also shows that sensors can be distinguished based on
noise statistics. However, there remain overlaps among some
sensors. The right pane shows 2-D clustering of the sensors.
Sensors can be distinguished more precisely by using one more
feature of sensor’s noise i.e. mean value. The scatter plot on
the right-hand side clusters each chunk with its respective
mean and variance. The separation is quite clear but there
remain overlaps, e.g., sensor4, sensor8 and sensor10. We
need additional features to further eliminate such overlaps.
In Figure 8, by adding one more feature, i.e. mean average
deviation, sensor4, sensor8 and sensor10 can be distinguished.
VI. SENSING TECHNOLOGIES AND BASIS FOR
FINGERPRINTS
In this section, we explain the working principle of the
sensing technologies under study. This insight in sensor con-
struction and functionality is an aid in understanding the
sources of sensor noise and fingerprints.
A. Ultrasonic Level Sensors
Water treatment testbed uses ultrasonic sensors based on a
piezoelectric (PZT ceramic) material transducer. The level of
water in a tank is calculated by measuring the return time
of the acoustic wave after hitting the water surface. Several
factors contribute to variations in the measurements obtained
from ultrasonic sensors. These measurements depend on the
speed of sound which changes according to the surrounding
temperature. Speed of sound through air as a function of
temperature can be expressed as [68],
cair(t) = C0 +Kt, (7)
where, t is the temperature in degree Celsius; K is the rate of
change of speed, which is approximately 0.607 m/s at every
1 degree Celsius change; and C0 is the speed of sound in air
at 0 degree Celsius which is 331.45 m/s. Besides temperature,
obstacles like tank walls reflect echo sooner than it should
be, contributing towards noise in the measurements. Water
sloshing is another reason for erroneous level measurements.
Ultrasonic level sensors depend on PZT ceramic transducer
to convert sound waves into electrical signals. These PZT
materials convert sound vibrations to an electric signal. The
acoustic impedance of these transducers also depends on tem-
perature thus adding another source of noise [69]. Thermal and
polarisation noise are the main sources of voltage fluctuation
in piezoelectric ceramics. Thermal noise originates from in-
teraction of phonons with free electrons or holes. The spectral
density of this noise is proportional to sensor resistance and
temperature. Electrical polarization in piezoelectric materials
is also a source of voltage fluctuation [70].
Antenna
Transmiting
Circuit
Fig. 9. RADAR level sensor construction. Antenna is the element responsible
to capture microwaves reflected from the water surface. Operating frequency
is 26 GHz [71].
Electromagnetic 
Coil
Electrodes
Fig. 10. Electromagnetic flow meter structure. Electromagnetic coils generate
a constant electric field. When water (conducting fluid) flows through mag-
netic field, a voltage proportional to water speed, is induced at electrodes [72].
B. Microwave Level Sensors
The microwave level/distance sensor, often called RADAR
(RAdio Distance and Ranging) works in a similar way as
ultrasonic sensors. A microwave pulse is emitted by the
antenna that travels at the speed of light and upon hitting the
surface of the target it is reflected back and received at the
same antenna. The distance between the antenna and target
is calculated based on the time it takes for the microwave to
travel that distance. In the case study reported here the waves
are bounced back by water with a dielectric constant of 80
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(stronger reflections) which is higher than dielectric constant
1 (no reflection) of free space. This implies that enough energy
will be reflected and reach the antenna.
Figure 9, shows the microwave level sensor used in water
distribution testbed [67]. Similar to an ultrasonic sensor where
the sound wave hits the transducer to produce an output
voltage and calculate the distance, in microwave based level
sensor it is the antenna where the electromagnetic energy is
received and distance calculated. These antennae are designed
to have a 50Ω resistance so that once connected with a cable
of characteristic impedance of 50Ω, maximum power transfer
takes place from the antenna. The sensor under consideration
is designed to operate at 26 GHz with a beam angle of 22o and
1µW effective radiated power [71]. However, in practice these
specifications have deviation for the same type and design of
an antenna due to manufacturing imperfections and installation
inaccuracies. For example, antenna connection with a cable
will result in impedance variations [73]. Also, beam angle and
radiation pattern varies for each antenna leading to deviations
from theoretical design resulting in different range resolution
that is ultimately reflected in sensor noise [74].
C. Electromagnetic Flow Meters
The electromagnetic flow meters follow Faraday’s law of
induction according to which a voltage is induced by an
electrically conductive fluid passing through a magnetic field.
In an electromagnetic flow meter, the medium acts as the
electrical conductor when flowing through the meter tube, and
the induced voltage is proportional to the average flow velocity
(the faster the flow rate, the higher the voltage). The induced
voltage is picked up by a pair of electrodes, mounted in the
meter tube, and transmitted to a flow transmitter to produce
various standardized output signals. Using the pipe cross-
sectional area, the flow volume is calculated by the transmitter.
The following equation is applicable to the induced voltage:
U = K ∗B ∗ V ∗D (8)
where U is the induced voltage, K is the instrument constant,
B is the magnetic field strength, V is the mean velocity of the
fluid, and D is the pipe cross-section.
A commercial electromagnetic flow meter is shown in
figure 10 [72]. It’s internal structure consists of a pair of coils
mounted on the top and bottom of an electrically insulated
flow tube. A pair of electrodes protrude through the flow tube
wall perpendicular to the pipe axes and largely normal to the
direction of the generated magnetic field. As the liquid passes
through the pipe, it moves through the magnetic field and the
positive and negative ions within the liquid experience a force
upon them. The forces on the ions cause them to migrate and
result in an electric field being generated across the pipe. The
Voltage generated across the pipe is measured between the
electrodes. Noise in these sensor readings come from the area
of the electrodes and size of the electro-magnets generating
electromagnetic field B. The installation and alignment of
electrodes and coils will result in different stray capacitance
and noise [75].
Fig. 11. Time series data from a level sensor for a constant water level.
Fig. 12. Noise distribution for the time series of the ultrasonic level sensor.
VII. VISUALIZING THE PERFORMANCE
A. Noise Signal Time Series
NoiSense, as mentioned, is a sensor fingerprint based on the
measurement noise from a sensor. To visualize let’s consider
a water level sensor in the water treatment plant. Figure 11
shows a time series signal measured by the level sensor that
is supposed to measure a constant water level in a tank. In
Figure 11 the value returned by the level sensor around a mean
value is considered a noise vector. On the right-hand side, in
Figure 12 the distribution of the noise vector is shown. It is
observed that the noise profile follows a Gaussian distribution.
For each sensor, a fingerprint is obtained based on this noise
distribution.
B. Confusion Matrix
For visualizing the performance of propose NoiSense, an
experiment is a setup using 20 sensors of the same type
and model manufactured by the same vendor. All the sen-
sors are mounted on top of the same water tank one after
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another. Multiclass classification is performed by comparing
each sensor with the rest of the sensors to figure out how
effective is the fingerprints. In Figure 13 it is observed that
all the sensors could be identified rightfully based on the
NoiSense. This result points out that for a reasonable number
of sensors that is the case of a medium-scale plant, we
could fingerprint sensors based on their fingerprint even for
the same type of sensors. NoiSense does not need any extra
hardware deployment and it is a passive method for figuring
out if the data is not being generated from our legitimate
sensors but some malicious device or being spoofed during
communicating to other devices such as PLC.
Fig. 13. Confusion matrix for 20 small ultrasonic sensors.
C. Limitations
We would like to highlight that although our proposal is
a passive method and it does not depend on the number of
sensors under attack but there are still some limitations.
Sensor Attacks only: The proposed NoiSense detects attacks
on the sensors and it is not able to detect attacks on actuators.
However, actuator fingerprinting techniques [64] already exist
and could be used in parallel to NoiSense to provide a holistic
technique for attack detection.
Detection Time: Stateless detection techniques (e.g., bad-data
detector) or stateful detection techniques (e.g., CUSUM) might
be able to raise an alarm if the attack is abrupt like a fault, but
NoiSense needs a chunk of data to extract the noise vector and
make a decision. Therefore, NoiSense might take more time
in some situations as compared to other statistical detectors.
However, NoiSense has proven to be more successful in cases
where statistical detectors had failed against a smart stealthy
attacker.
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Challenges and Opportunities: We observed that one of
the dominating challenges in CPS as compared to pure IT
systems is that there is a whole lot of physical processes to be
secured besides the cyber infrastructure. The same challenge of
securing the physical systems becomes an opportunity if the
physics of the normal process could be modeled accurately.
Also, we highlighted that the integrity of data is more critical
than the confidentiality of data in CPS.
State of the Art: Attack detection is an important step toward
attack mitigation and recovery. There have been extensive
efforts in model-based attack detection in CPS. However,
model-based attack detection techniques suffer from several
limitations such as inability against stealthy and multi-point
attacks, interference to the normal process.
Device Fingerprinting: We put forth the idea of device fin-
gerprinting using the hardware characteristics of sensors, such
as measurement noise from a sensor. An idea called NoiSense
boosts the usability for being a passive (non-intrusive) attack
detection solution, which is an important requirement for CPS.
Conclusions: Physics-based solutions are effective in the
detection of attacks to CPS. However, this approach also has
its limitations. There does not exist a silver bullet to tackle
all kinds of threats perfectly. Different security solutions may
need to be combined to provide holistic protection for CPS.
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